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Economics and security seem increasingly intertwined. Citing national security, states
subject foreign investments to new scrutiny, even unwinding mergers. The provision
of 5G has become a diplomatic battleground—Huawei at its center. Meanwhile, states
invoke national security to excuse trade wars. The USA invoked the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade national security exception to impose steel and aluminum tariffs,
threatening more on automotive parts. Russia invoked that provision to justify its block-
ade of Ukraine, as did Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to excuse theirs of
Qatar. And with the spread of COVID-19, states are invoking national security to scruti-
nize supply lines. Multiplying daily, such stories have led some observers to dub the era
one of geoeconomics. Nonetheless, these developments remain difficult to judge, and
the relationship between economics and national security remains confused and slippery.
The essay seeks clarity in the deeper logic of these labels, revealing a fundamental choice
between the logics ofmarkets and the logics of state.Whether invoked to ‘secure’ borders,
privacy, health, the environment, or jobs, ‘national security’ is a claim about the proper
location of policymaking. Appeals to economics, with their emphasis on global welfare
and global person-to-person relationships, are such claims as well. Resolving disputes,
this essay argues, requires recognizing these root choices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic and security policy seem increasingly entangled. Often relegated to differ-
ent sections of the newspaper, recent headlines feature both together, and often on the
front page. Citingnational security concerns, states around theworld are subjecting for-
eign investments to new levels of scrutiny. In some cases, national authorities are even
unwinding mergers, forcing divestments in the USA, for example, of LGBTQ dating
app Grindr and video-sharing app TikTok. The provision of 5G networking services
has become a diplomatic battleground. Huawei, a Chinese company, battles not only
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its worldwide competitors for contracts, but the US government as well. The latter,
declaring Huawei a national security threat, has not only restricted its activities in its
territory, but has openly lobbied other countries to ban it, dangling US security coop-
eration as an incentive.Meanwhile, states have invokednational security to excuse trade
wars and imposed tradewars in service of their national security.TheUSA invokedboth
its national security laws and the national security exception to theGeneral Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—Article XXI—to impose steel and aluminum tariffs on
many of its trading partners and has threatened to do the same regarding automotive
parts. Russia invoked the sameGATTprovision to justify its blockade ofUkraine, as did
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to excuse their blockade of Qatar. All three
cases were challenged under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, the first disputes over Article XXI in the GATT’s history to reach
dispute settlement. These stories though are but a few of the many that have led some
observers to dub the current era one of geoeconomics.1 And these trends have only
accelerated with the spread of the global COVID-19 pandemic and feared shortages
of personal protective equipment, ventilators, vital medicines, and eventually vaccines.
Invoking national security, states around theworld began to scrutinize supply lines, add
medical equipment to the sectors subject tonational security investment screening, and
throw up export controls designed to keep supplies at home.
Butdespite (orperhapsbecauseof) all the recent attention, the relationshipbetween
economics and national security remains confused and uncertain. Popular frames like
geoeconomics may accurately describe current events, but they are ambivalent in their
diagnoses, leaving it unclear whether the blurring of economics and national security
is something worth encouraging or fighting, a harbinger of something new or a return
to historic norms. And this ambivalence reflects a deeper confusion in our discourse
whether economics and national security are rivals or partners, whether economics is
a tool of national security or national security a protector of economic relations.
The problem, this essay argues, is that we have misunderstood what economics and
national security labels do. In line with rough caricatures of economics as business and
national security as war, we treat the two as categories of behavior or subjects of reg-
ulation. Once we know what something is, we know which rules to apply. But neither
economics nor national security is self-defining nor defined in these debates, leaving
their contents fundamentally contested.Thesameactivities canbedefinedas a function
of one, the other, or both.
Parsing carefully the claims being made, and the various possible meanings of eco-
nomics and national security, the essay argues that economics and national security
operatenot as subjects but as claims. Currentdebates, far fromcapturing the suits v. uni-
forms caricature, actually instantiate a muchmore fundamental choice in international
law and international relations, between the logic of markets and the logic of state.
Whether invoked to ‘secure’ borders, privacy, health, the environment, or jobs, claims
of national security are claims about the proper location of policymaking. Appeals to
1 Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes and Victor Ferguson, ‘Toward a Geoeconomic Order in Interna-
tional Trade and Investment’, 22 Journal of International Economic Law 655 (2019).
Nations and Markets • 795
economics, with their emphasis on global welfare and global person-to-person rela-
tionships, are such claims as well. The logics driving the current economics-national
security dynamic represent paradigmatic, competing models for organizing individu-
als with different normative justifications and concerns. Resolving the legal claims of
both requires recognizing these fundamental, root choices.
After surveying first, in Part I, current economics-security tensions and then, in Part
II, the legal rules with which they engage, this essay explores our instincts about the
relationship between economics and security in Part III and the deeper logics ofmarket
and nation animating them in Part IV. Part V describes how international law applies
different logics to different subfields, while Part VI plumbs the meaning and role of
national security claims. National security, I argue in that Part, has been miscast as a
subject, when it is in fact, a claim—specifically, a claim to organize subjects through
the logic of nations. Part VI wrestles with the recognition that economics and security
may reflect irreconcilable paradigms, applying pluralist tools to both reframe current
legal tensions and suggest tools formanaging conflict. Part VIII uses these newpluralist
frames to recast emerging long-termfights in international law, particularly over climate
change and data.
A few notes on the terms used here: in international law terms, ‘trade’ is treated
as a specific legal subject and set of legal disciplines distinguishable from other areas
of transnational economic and non-economic activity. For the purposes of this essay,
exploring the relationship between transnational economic activity and national secu-
rity, ‘trade’ is used in its broader sense to describe the relationships created through
economic exchange. More bluntly, trade is used here as a stand-in for economic activ-
ity. The ‘trade regime’ is used to describe the legal regime governing the trade relations
between states including the WTO and free trade agreements.
Similarly, for thepurposesof thediscussionhere, focusedon international economic
law and security interests, I use the term ‘markets’ to describe the realmof interpersonal
relations. But these interpersonal relations aremuch richer thanmere contracts, reflect-
ing relationships of friendship, family, and interpersonal duties.They focus not only on
consent-based agreements, but on the duties and obligations each person holds to oth-
ers as well. As described below, the focus is on the way individuals organize through
direct interactions, rather than under the authority of the state.
And finally, this essay will use the term ‘nation’ somewhat interchangeably with the
more typical international law term—state.The point is not to be anachronistic, but to
highlight the relationship to ‘national security’ and to notions of community solidarity
that the term implies. As will become clearer below, nation also implies a normative
argument for authority and power that the term ‘state’ often obscures.
II. WORLDSCOLLIDING
Business and national security increasingly seem on a collision course. Following log-
ics of economic globalization fostered over the past few decades, businesses seek to
build worldwidemarkets built on world-spanning supply chains.Through flexible sup-
ply chain contracts, they seek out value in a borderless business landscape that they can
pass on to consumers and shareholders.
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Increasingly though, those borders and their guards seem to be reemerging from
the landscape as states reassert their security interests in the flow of goods, individu-
als, and information.The newborder posts are popping up everywhere. States consider
data localization requirements to guarantee access to information necessary tomonitor
threats or prosecute criminals.2 States subject foreign investment to increasing scrutiny,
reaching beyond traditionally sensitive sectors into new areas featuring more specu-
lative concerns. The US move to block acquisition of the LGBTQ dating app Grindr
by a Chinese company, based on concerns regarding data security and usage,3 is per-
haps themost notable example.More recent investigations of the video-sharing service,
TikTok, created by the merger ofMusical.ly into the Chinese company ByteDance, are
yet another.4 Both actions were taken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS), an interagency committee tasked with reviewing foreign
acquisitions in the USA for national security concerns. Those actions followed closely
on decisions to block acquisitions of Lattice Semiconductors by Canyon Bridge Capi-
tal Partners, a US-headquartered private equity firm reportedly funded by the Chinese
government5 and ofQualcommby Singapore-basedBroadcom,6 each raising concerns
about national dominance of 5G communications technology.
This sudden spate of activity is unlikely to abate. In 2018, the US Congress passed
the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, which extends the cover-
age of CFIUS review to include ‘certain non-controlling investments into certain U.S.
businesses involved in critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal
data.’7 And the USA is not alone in exercising investment screening. The European
Union has, in the past year, adopted amechanism to screen foreign investments in crit-
ical infrastructure for national security concerns,8 as have many of its member states.
TheglobalCOVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this process, with theEUencouraging
the use of investment screening to protect critical and strategic healthcare industries
2 See Anupam Chander and Uyên P. Lê, ‘Data Nationalism’, 64 Emory Law Journal 677 (2015) (surveying
localization laws).
3 See Georgia Wells and Kate O’Keeffe, ‘U.S. Orders Chinese Firm to Sell Dating App over Blackmail Risk’,
Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2019.
4 See Greg Roumeliotis, Yingzhi Yang, Echo Wang and Alexandra Alper, ‘Exclusive: U.S. Opens National
Security Investigation into TikTok—sources’, Reuters, 1 November 2019 at 11:21 AM, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sour
ces-idUSKBN1XB4IL.
5 See Liana B. Baker, ‘Trump Bars Chinese-backed Firm from buying U.S. Chipmaker Lattice’, Reuters, 13
September 2017 at 4:22 PM, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lattice-m-a-canyonbridge-trump/trump-
bars-chinese-backed-firm-from-buying-u-s-chipmaker-lattice-idUSKCN1BO2ME.
6 See Alan Rappeport and Cecilia Kang, ‘U.S. Calls Broadcom’s Bid for Qualcomm a National Security Risk’,
New York Times, 16 March 2018.
7 United States Department of Treasury, Press Releases, ‘Treasury Releases Final Regulations to Reform
National Security Reviews for Certain Foreign Investments and Other Transactions in the United States’,
13 January 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm872.
8 See Sophie Meunier, ‘Monkey Cage: The E.U. Will Start Screening Foreign Investment. Here’s the
Full Story’, Washington Post, 10 April 2019 at 6:00 AM EDT, https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/2019/04/10/eu-will-start-screening-foreign-investment-heres-full-story/; Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into
the Union, 2017/0224 (COD) PE-CONS 72/18, Brussels, 20 February 2019 (OR. en).
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from foreign raiders.9 Spain, Italy,10 and the Czech Republic,11 among others, have
sought to update their own rules; France explicitly added biotechnologies to its list
of strategic industries warranting special investment screening.12 Outside of Europe,
Australia, India,13 and China14 have all recently updated their laws providing for
national security review of foreign investments.
Labs and scientific collaborations, once held up as symbols of global cooperation,
are now viewed with suspicion. State authorities worry that they have been infiltrated
by foreign spies eager to steal intellectual property and sensitive technologies.15 Amidst
proliferating stories of visa denials, lab raids, and arrests,16 director of the US Federal
Bureauof InvestigationsChristopherWray told a crowdat theCouncil onForeignRela-
tions that ‘the academic sector needs to be much more sophisticated and thoughtful
about how others may exploit the very open, collaborative research environment that
we have in this country and revere in this country.’17 And at the end of May 2020, the
US President issued a proclamation barring entry of and potentially revoking visas for
Chinese students with ties to Chinese military schools.18
At the same time, tradeflows are beingweaponized, as states look to turn the increas-
ing dependence of businesses on globalmarkets and supply chains into leverage. Tariffs
and blockades are instruments of choice in pressure campaigns—from Saudi Arabia
and theUnitedArabEmirates’ ongoing fightswithQatar19 toRussia’s warwithUkraine
to US attempts to pressure Mexico over Central American migration.20 Within the
past year, Japan apparently retaliated against South Korean court decisions authoriz-
ing suits against Japanese companies for forced labor duringWorldWar II by restricting
9 See Przemyslaw Kowalski, ‘Will the Post-COVID World be Less Open to Foreign Direct Investment?’, in
Richard E. Baldwin and Simon J. Evenett (eds),COVID-19 andTrade Policy:WhyTurning InwardWon’tWork
141 (London: CEPR Press, 2020) 131–151.
10 See ibid, at 144.
11 See Marek Hrubeš, ‘Czech FDI Screening Bill—Get Ready For New Regulatory Challenges’, O-I-CEE!, 19
May 2020, https://www.ceelegalblog.com/2020/05/czech-fdi-screening-bill-get-ready-for-new-regulatory-
challenges/.
12 ChristineGrahamet al., ‘Impact ofCOVID-19 onGlobal ForeignDirect Investment ScreeningMechanisms’,
Cooley, 15 June 2020, https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2020/2020-06-15-covid-19-global-foreign-
direct-investment-screening.
13 See Kowalski, above n 9, at 145.
14 See Chieh Huang, ‘China’s Take on National Security and Its Implications on the Evolution of International
Economic Law’ (unpublished paper).
15 See, e.g., Dennis Normile, ‘China’s Scientists Alarmed, Bewildered by Growing Anti-Chinese Sentiment in
the United States’, Science, 31 July 2019; Elizabeth Redden, ‘Stealing Innovation’, Inside Higher Education, 29
April 2019 (discussing FBI Director Christopher Wray’s speech at the Council on Foreign Relations calling
‘for a ‘whole-of-society’ response to economic espionage threats’).
16 For more on the Department of Justice’s ‘China Initiative,’ see Margaret K. Lewis, ‘Criminalizing China’, 111
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (forthcoming December 2020).
17 Redden, above n 15.
18 Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, ‘U.S. to Expel Chinese Graduate Students With Ties to China’s Military
Schools’,New York Times, 28 May 2020.
19 United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, inMinutes ofMeetingHeld in theCentreWilliamRappard on 22November 2017, paras
3.1–3.15, WT/DSB/M/404, 6 March 2018.
20 See ScottR. Anderson andKathleenClaussen, ‘TheLegal Authority BehindTrump’sNewTariffs onMexico’,
Lawfare, 3 June 2019 at 4:19 PM, https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-trumps-new-tariffs-
mexico.
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access to key chemicals neededbySouthKorea’s semiconductor industry and removing
South Korea from its list of ‘trusted’ trade partners. South Koreans have responded by
boycotting Uniqlo and other Japanese products.21 Applying US export control laws,
Chinese tech companiesHuawei andZTEhave been cut off frombuying keyAmerican
components; concerns about 5G dominance, surveillance and artificial intelligence,
sanctions violations, and trade war leverage have variously been cited as justifications.
Chinese technology companies have also been targeted by India. Following military
tensions at the disputed Himalayan border, India announced a ban on ‘59 mobile apps
which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of
state and public order.’22 All 59, including again notably TikTok, were Chinese. And
at the same time they are being weaponized, trade flows are increasingly treated as
assets; the balance of trade is seen as measure of relative power and trade skirmishes
as attempts to rebalance it in one state’s favor or another.
The intermingling of economics and national security is not new. Each of these
stories has analogs in the recent and distant past. Some might even argue that the
intermingling is a return to historical norms, but the rapid cascading of national secu-
rity claims, including the first claims under the GATT national security exception to
make it to dispute settlement, is a notable break from the past few decades of relative
trade ‘peace.’ And while the various overlapping legal regimes could absorb a stray con-
flict here and there—as they had with US Cuba sanctions,23 for example—they are
straining to remain standing in the face of so many rapid-fire blows.
Lawyers, domestic and international, had sought to channel the parrying between
economic and security logics into a carefully choreographed dance of legal rules and
dispute settlement mechanisms, but the dance increasingly looks more like a wrestling
match. It is thus not surprising to see lawyers jumping back onto the floor to pull the
fighters apart in the hopes of reasserting discipline.
III. THE LIMITSOF LEGAL FRAMES
To date, much of the conversation has been refracted through a series of legal rules
that might define these relationships. Some of these rules are anchored within interna-
tional economic law. Within the trade regime, for example, the relationship between
economics and national security is governed primarily by Article XXI of the GATT,
which provides that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests.’24 This channels the relationship between trade
21 See Catherine Kim, ‘The Escalating Trade War Between South Korea and Japan, Explained’, Vox, 9 August
2019 at 4:30 PM EDT, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/8/9/20758025/trade-war-south-korea-japan;
Simon Denyer, ‘Japan-South Korea dispute escalates as both sides downgrade trade ties’, Washington Post,
2 August 2019 at 4:20 AM EDT.
22 Government of India Press Information Bureau, ‘Government Bans 59 mobile apps which are prejudicial to
sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order’, 29 June 2020 at 8:47
PM, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1635206.
23 ‘European Union reaches accord with the United States on Helms-Burton’, Associated Press, 11 April 1997,
https://apnews.com/cb3158dd5921f5af2fcdece96467f17e.
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, article XXI, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
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and security through questions about necessity, essentiality, the categories of security
interest listed in the article, and most of all, the discretionary space created by ‘it con-
siders.’25 Those questions long structured arguments between members of the GATT
and WTO about permissible measures. They are the questions that the WTO dispute
settlement panel was forced to answer in the dispute brought by Ukraine against Rus-
sia, the first formal dispute raising that exception as a defense,26 and which will need
to be answered by the panels considering US steel and aluminum tariffs. Article XIV
bis of General Agreement on Trade in Services and Article 73 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights apply the same standards to dis-
putes regarding those issues.The formermay become relevant to brewing disputes over
digital service restrictions; the latter came up in a recent dispute over the Saudi Arabia-
based pirating of sports broadcasting from Qatar.27 Investment treaties have their own
clauses exempting ‘essential security’ issues, each with their own specific language. At
the domestic level, statutes may establish their own standards for deviating from trade
or investment rules.28
On the flipside of the equation, rules governing international security may dictate
when international economic obligations must give way. The United Nations Charter
authorizes the Security Council to mandate ‘complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations’29 in an effort ‘tomaintain or restore international peace and security.’30
The primacy of this provision is explicitly recognized in GATT XXI(c).31 The Arti-
cles of State Responsibility establish general rules for invoking ‘necessity’ to excuse
their violations or to engage in otherwise unlawful countermeasures.32 The Law of
Armed Conflict dictates when objects of ordinary international economic relations
can become military targets.33 And domestic national security statute may ground
authority to engage economic sanctions.34 Altogether, it is these rules that the WTO
25 See, e.g., RogerP.Alford, ‘TheSelf-JudgingWTOSecurityException’, 2011UtahL.Rev. 697 (2011); Stephan
Schill and Robyn Briese, “‘If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement’,
13Max Planck Yearbook of UnitedNations Law 61 (2009); Dapo Akande and SopeWilliams, ‘International
Adjudication onNational Security Issues:WhatRole for theWTO?’, 43Virginia Journal of International Law
365 (2003).
26 Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, 5 April 2019 (adopted 26 April 2019). See
Tania Voon, ‘Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit’, 114 American Journal of International Law
96 (2020).
27 Saudi Arabia—Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS567, 16 June 2020.
28 For an excellent in-depth discussion, see Kathleen Claussen, ‘Trade’s Security Exceptionalism’, 72 Stanford
LawReview 1097 (2020).The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), for example, grants
the US president powers to deal with ‘any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.’ Title II of Public Law
95-223, 91 Statute 1626, enacted 28 October 1977. Section 232 grants the president authority to adjust
imports that ‘threaten to impair the national security.’ 19 United States Code (USC) §1862.
29 UN Charter Article 41.
30 UN Charter Article 39.
31 See above n 7.
32 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 25 (2001).
33 Such rules might dictate when a ship and its goods might be seized as contraband, when roads or railways
might be bombed, when a dual-use factory might become a legal target, or when a cyber-attack crosses a
threshold allowing for a counterattack on another states cyber-capacities.
34 See, e.g., IEEPA, discussed in n 28 above.
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Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), investment arbitral tribunals, the International Court
of Justice, or domestic courts are asked to parse in resolving disputes.
Much of the time, these rules help discipline the invocation of economic and secu-
rity interests, channeling those interests through particular language and into particular
dispute settlement mechanisms. But when the conflict between economic and secu-
rity interests is heightened, resolving them through particular language is unlikely to
be fully satisfying. At the end of the day, all of these tests hinge on some assessment of
the relative normative value of the economic and security claims being made. ‘Essen-
tial,’ ‘Necessary,’ ‘Security,’ and ‘Peace,’ are subjective assessments even when cloaked
in objective tests. Any seemingly neutral attempt at applying a test’s language is likely
to hide a normative theory of the relationship between economics and security.
IV. RELATINGTRADEANDSECURITY
Part of what makes these developments so confounding is the ambivalent relationship
between trade and security. Sometimes, trade is treated as an extension of national
security; sanctions, embargos, and blockades are levers of power in international rela-
tions that can be used to bend others to a states’ will, as recognized in the United
Nations Charter.35 Current examples are far too numerous to list, but would include
US sanctions on Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia; Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates’ efforts to pressure Qatar; or Russia’s efforts to pressure
Ukraine. On the flipside, under the same logic, trade imbalances are treated as evidence
of national weakness. In the broadest sense, states with more positive trade flows are
seen asmore powerful international players. In the narrower sense, ceding control over
certain sensitive technologies, from 5G to microchips, steel to footwear36 is seen as a
potential security threat.
Other times, trade is treated as source of national security. Many have supported
improved trade relations between states as a means to improve relations, to develop
interconnectedness and interdependence, and to drive cultural exchange. Robust trade
relations can foster friendship between peoples and reduce friction between states.
Trade fosters peace and reduces the need for war. Versions of this view have often been
cited as justifications for the post-World War II Bretton Woods arrangements37 and,
since 1994, for theWorld TradeOrganization. By this account, a world bound by trade
is a securer world in which border defenses become unnecessary, superfluous, perhaps
even impediments.
Still on other occasions, trade and security are conceptualized as choices, more
ploughshares or more swords, businessmen or soldiers, making deals or making war.
35 UN Charter Article 41.
36 See Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT L/4250, 17 November 1975, at para 4; GATT
Council, ‘Minutes ofMeeting’, GATTC/M/109, 10November 1975, at 8–9; Sweden—Import Restrictions on
Certain Footwear, GATT L/4250/Add.1, 15 March 1977, at 1.
37 ‘I reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of trade—freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and
obstructions—so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all
countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a rea-
sonable chance for lasting peace.’ CordellHull,TheMemoirs of CordellHull (NewYork:MacmillanPublishers,
1948) 84.
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Laws—national and international—are often framed this way, laying out one set of
pathways or rules if trade is invoked, another if security is.
Toggling between these different frameworks can make discussions of the relation-
ship between trade and security slippery and confusing. The best we can usually do is
to pick one conceptualization and work through the relationship within it. Part of the
problem is that there are actually subtledifferencesbetween theways inwhich the terms
‘trade’ and ‘security’ are used in these different contexts. In the first conceptualization,
trade is a tool, a discrete activity that is encouraged, allowed, limited, or prohibited as
means towards some broader aim, e.g. wealth, happiness, or security. In the second,
trade is used to describe something broader—a set of relationships or ways of relat-
ing to one another that can obviate the need for fear or insecurity. In the third, trade
is a way of describing a fundamental method of organizing human relations, a choice
of markets over nations. Security is used similarly. In the second model, security is a
desired outcome. In the first, security is the fundamental purpose of society, shorthand
for the Hobbesian view that society and state exist for fundamental purpose of provid-
ing security against the savagery of others. Security and state in this view are one and
the same.
V. COMPETINGPARADIGMS
These subtle differences hint at a more fundamental, more difficult relationship
between trade and security lurkingbehind these conceptualizations. Trade and security
fundamentally are competing paradigms, ways to see the world and organize relation-
ships. The reason why the relationship is so difficult to conceptualize is because the
relationship looks different depending which paradigm one is in.
The paradigm of trade imagines the ‘market’ and the interpersonal relationships of
exchange that it fosters as the ideal of human relationships. Individuals exercise their
will by choosing the things theywant tomakeor acquire.When tradeworks best, every-
one is happier for the exchanges. In this paradigm, security is a hedge, a set of tools to
use when the market and choice break down, when some individuals use their power
to dominate others and strip them of their choice and will. Security is thus written as
the exception, an alarm button behind glass that when pushed unleashes the protec-
tive power of the state. The paradigm of security is quite different. Security imagines
the solidarity of the nation as a means to transcend the state of nature, the threat of
interpersonal domination, and unleash happiness. It is through community rules and
the pooling of power to enforce them that individuals are able to create the conditions
allowing individuals to thrive. Security is the ultimate purpose of the state. Trade can
be valuable, but it can only provide benefits if security is assured and, accordingly, must
always be a secondary consideration.
The security exceptions to trade and investment agreements, the domestic statutes
authorizing economic securitymeasures, the necessity provision of theArticles of State
Responsibility, and the UN Charter’s grant of sanctions authority all operate as glass
doors between these two parallel universes. Some, like the GATT security exception,
open from the trade side; others like the UN Charter open from the security side.
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Trade and security are each totalizing paradigms through which to view the world
that view the realm of the other as the exception; seen through the eyes of the trade
regime, security is a regrettable, but sometimes necessary evil; through the eyes of the
security regime, trade is a peacetime privilege, rather than right, and a wartime tool.38
The exceptions’ clauses act as doors between these two parallel universes. But the code
for opening them is different depending onwhich side one is on.Thismakes relying on
them to contain disputes between the two worldviews extraordinarily dangerous.
VI. ORGANIZING INDIVIDUALS
This underlying logic hints at the broader dispute the trade-security debates surface. At
a deep level, international law and international society are torn between two compet-
ing models of how to organize individuals. This is compounded (though not created)
by the liberalism underlying much of the system’s rules. One common description of
liberalism is that it elevates the value of the individual and the individual will. Each per-
son has dignity, is a subject rather than an object of the law, whose choices areworthy of
respect. Such formulations are common fodder of human rights instruments. But those
basic commitments pose a challenge for broader organization: how can/should those
competingwills be accommodatedwhen individuals come into contact or conflictwith
one another? If each individual’s will is worthy of respect and should be promoted,
how can they be balanced against one another? Today, two imperfect answers domi-
nate in international law: the market and the nation.39 The former reflects the logic of
the interpersonal. Individuals find each other and build consensual relationships based
on affinity, exchange, or contract. Individual wills are accommodated through consen-
sual interactions and interpersonal obligations. Such self-organization has taken many
forms, but then at a macro, international level, this type of organization is today often
associated with the market. The latter reflects the logic of community. Individual wills
are accommodated through notions of group solidarity and, in some cases, democratic
decision-making. Such communities can take many forms and may be of varying size,
ranging from the family or the congregation, to the locality, province, state, or even
international organization, but the dominant imagined policymaking unit today, the
38 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1979)126 (‘Only if survival is assured can states safely seek suchother goals as tranquility, profit, andpower.’).
39 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Whose International Law—Sovereignty andNon-StateGroups’, 88 American
Society of International Law Proceedings 1, 1 (1994) (describing ‘two current, competing visions of interna-
tional relations—namely, international society and liberal transnational civil society-and their accompanying
approaches to sovereignty’).The particular shape of these twomodels—themix of liberties and responsibil-
ities, right and duties attached to each—has shifted with shifting conceptions of the individual, community,
society, and nation. Today, these two views might be best exemplified by Freidrich Hayek and John Rawls.
Whereas Hayek argued that individual liberty was best protected by maintaining a well-functioning transna-
tional market, Rawls focused on the duties owed by individuals to each other within a particular nation or
society. For Rawls, the duties owed to those outside the political community were decidedly secondary, as
hisThe Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) demonstrates.
Nations and Markets • 803
presumptive font of communitarian authority at the international level, is the nation or
state.40
Neither model is above criticism from within the logic of liberalism. Both forms
of relationship, while able to help individuals realize their goals in groups, can also
threaten individual liberty. The market allows for domination of weaker individuals by
more powerful ones. The nation allows the majority to dominate the minority. Both
systems have developed methods to soften those concerns, including fiduciary duties
or requirements of consent (sometimes, deep and robust; sometimes, thin) in the for-
mer and notions of rights and due process in the latter.41 They have also each sought to
remedy their respective deficiencies by creating space for the other to operate as a coun-
terweight. Markets rely on the laws of nations to guarantee against certain, particularly
evil forms of domination and to guarantee the continued functioning of the market-
place. Nations cede massive areas of policy space to markets, allowing individuals to
vote through their interpersonal interactions rather than through group politics.
At the international level, the ambivalencebetween these twomethodsof organizing
has led to a rough division of labor across different ‘fields,’ ‘subjects,’ or ‘disciplines.’ In
some, international law leans heavily on the state, granting it primary authority and
obligation to achieve policy goals. In others, international law leans heavily onmarkets
or interpersonal interactions.42 Thebasic allocations of authority have been reasonably
stable over the past decades, but hardly uncontroverted, with critics questioning both
the location of authority in states or markets and the over-reliance on those two forms
of organizing over others.
Modern international law is deeply intertwined with states. Many of its most basic
rules exist not to constrain states (as some sovereigntists depict) but to empower them.
By recognizing the state as the basic unit of international relations, empowering those
who claim to speak in its name, endowing it with legal personality, and recognizing its
monopoly on force with its territorial boundaries, international law grants states’ first
crack at organizing individuals within their jurisdiction. All of international law in this
sense defaults back to states, as the political units able to make binding commitments.
International law’s general preference for states is true even in fields that seemdesigned
to limit state power in favor of the individual and interpersonal relations. Human rights
law, for example, self-consciously recognizes the liberty of individuals to self-organize
40 See, e.g., ibid, at 9. As Kingsbury explains of thismodel, ‘state sovereignty is the centering of power/authority
inside a given territory, enabling the development there of justice and law, freedom and social progress; but
it is also the negation of such community outside the state.’ Ibid, at 3.
41 Thesemodels are fluid: self-organization can result in communal organizationswhose relationship to individ-
uals begins to resemble nations, and nations can enter themarketplace and act as incredibly powerful market
players. Unsurprisingly, when these shifts happen, protections created for each model may seem insufficient,
drawing calls to regulate rights within corporations, NGOs, international organizations, and religious com-
munities through public law like rules of transparency, due process, and reason-giving or to treat nations like
ordinarymarket players, stripping themof privileges like sovereign immunity and subjecting them to notions
of fair dealing and contractual obligation.
42 These two conceptualizations are sometimes associated with Hedley Bull’s distinction between ‘plural-
ist’ views of international society in which states are the central subjects and ‘solidarist’ ones focused on
the transnational individual. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics
(London: Macmillan Publishers, 1977) 13.
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in social groups, families, religions, or political parties. But it embeds that libertywithin
states: states, not individuals or corporations, bear the obligation to respect the rights of
those within their jurisdiction; states, in turn, are granted a ‘margin of appreciation’ in
howbest to do so. Limitations andderogations clauses assume some room for the state’s
collectivity to make policy judgments on how best to balance various rights and policy
concerns against one another. Only in extremis are those state decisions scrutinized by
others outside the state. Only in extremis is the solidarity of individuals regionally or
worldwide elevated over the solidarity within the nation-state. International Criminal
Law goes further in elevating interpersonal obligations: individuals have obligations
not to harm other individuals in certain ways, regardless of their nationality and irre-
spective of any state’s orders. The recognition that ‘[c]rimes against international law
are committed by men, and not by abstract entities’43 is, in a sense, the ultimate vindi-
cation of individuals’ obligations to other individuals. Even in that field though, state
solidarity does not disappear. Jurisdiction is, for the most part,44 controlled by states
that opt into or vote for various international courts. More tellingly, jurisdiction is
cabined by the doctrine of complementarity, in which states get an exclusive crack at
providing justice that disappears only after states have proven ‘unwilling or unable’ to
do so.
By contrast, trade and investment law have been given over (by states—it is interna-
tional law, after all) to the logic of the interpersonal, or in their terms, the market. The
underlying assumption of both regimes is that comparative advantage knows nothing
about territorial boundaries and that markets will make better decisions in the global
allocation of goods, labor, and investment than states would. The state is thus rele-
gated to the margins, retaining supremacy over decisions deemed within its ambit—
redistribution, health and safety policy, environmental protection, and national secu-
rity. State intervention is treated as exceptional—literally—relegated principally to the
exceptions clauses like Articles XX and XXI of the GATT. By some accounts, this
was precisely the goal of the system’s designers, to insulate global markets from the
protectionists’ impulses of national decision-making.45
There is nothing inherent or obvious about the current allocation of subjects
between nation and market, and tensions often arise over implicit (or explicit) argu-
ments that the mix is incorrect. Human rights violations by transnational corpora-
tions, for example, have posed a challenge for human rights law’s state-focused regime.
Many arguments for recognizing corporate obligations to respect human rights invoke
notions of interpersonal responsibility—human rights responsibilities that those indi-
viduals (or groups of individuals, e.g. corporations) in a more powerful economic
43 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 223 (1947).
44 Obviously, there are exceptions, including ICC jurisdiction over non-state-party nationals who commit a
crime in the territory of a state-party, or perhaps, as in the Rohingya case, where crimes in a non-state-party
spill over into territory of a state-party. See Michail Vagias, ‘Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18’, 113 American
Journal of International Law 368 (2019).
45 See generally Quinn Slobodian,TheGlobalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
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position owe to those in a weaker one.46 They suggest a relational notion of human
rights quite different from the state-focused one we currently have.
Closely entwined with both borders and national welfare, migration is generally
seen as a matter for state policy within international law. But that frame is far from
uncontroverted. Some like Tendayi Achiume have tried to break out of this dynamic to
emphasize the transborder obligations between peoples.47 Applying the logic of trade,
economists often argue in favor of liberalized immigration and an open labor market
as a source of potential gains for all.48 And ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum’ invokes a different sort
of relationship, bringing to mind interpersonal obligations (sometimes described in
religious terms) to support those in danger and in need of help.49
To put it another way, while these regime frames are often taken for granted, they
are inherently unstable, in part because of the imperfect choices underlying each, and
in part because of the permeable lines between different policy areas delegated to each
method of organization. The lines we have drawn between trade and economic rights,
health and safety, andenvironmental policy, amongothers, while ingrained, aredifficult
to sustain, particularly as policy in each area deepens and widens in scope. This has
long been apparent in ‘trade and…’ topic areas, but is quickly coming to a head in new
areas like data regulation,50 freer of preconceptions, and subject to tugs-of-war between
different paradigms or frames.
VII. DEFININGNATIONAL SECURITY
Recognizing these elemental tensions in international law and international relations
put national security claims in a new light. Attempts at cutting through the normative
fog often start by trying the define, or really, delimit, the subject ‘national security.’
Security, as exemplified in thewide range of stories noted at the beginning of this paper,
is a difficult concept to restrain in the wild. Its blob-like character presents a daunting,
even menacing challenge.51 As Ben Heath has well-documented, the range of issues
credibly described as security seems to be expanding exponentially with each passing
decade.52 Therehave alwaysbeenexpansive, abusive security claims—2019’s claim that
46 See, e.g., ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
withRegard toHumanRights’, U.N. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) (‘Recognizing that even though
States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and pro-
tect human rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are also
responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.’).
47 E. Tendayi Achiume, ‘Migration as Decolonization’, 71 Stanford Law Review 1509 (2019); E. Tendayi
Achiume, ‘Governing Xenophobia’, 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 333 (2018).
48 See, e.g., David Dollar and Aart Kraay, ‘Spreading the Wealth’, 81(1) Foreign Affairs 120 (January/February
2002).
49 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘Undocumented Migrants and the Failures of Universal Individualism’, 47
Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 699, 706–07 (2014).
50 See below Part IX.
51 See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era
(New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 18.
52 J. Benton Heath, ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, 129 Yale Law Journal 924
(2020). See also Congyan Cai, ‘Enforcing a New National Security—China’s National Security Law and
International Law’, 10 Journal of East Asia and International Law 65 (2017).
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off-shoring auto-parts research threatens US national security53 brings to mind 1975’s
threat to Sweden from footwear imports54—though arguably, in the 21st centuryworld
of complex supply chains, any key product could be the source of ‘weaponized interde-
pendence.’55 But those prior claims usually posited some nexus to traditional warfare
or its demands. Today, no one blinks when data and cyber security, terrorism, eco-
nomic crisis, drug and human trafficking, infectious diseases, and even climate change
are described as national security concerns. This has led to attempts to contain the
blob, to demand that security only be invoked as an exception to trade when it bears
a close relationship to traditional militarized security. This is one of the techniques
floated by the WTO dispute settlement panel in Russia—Traffic in Transit case. In that
decision, the panel emphasized the proximity of the Russia–Ukraine conflict to more
traditional notions of warfare as a factor in favor of Russia’s invocation of GATTArticle
XXI.56 Overall though, the push is often to define ‘security’ as ameans of cabining these
exceptions.
But this tact, I would argue, misses the underlying dynamic driving the blob’s
growth. It is ‘national’ rather than ‘security’ that seems to be doing much of the work.
National security is not a subject of international regulation, but a claim about where
regulation should be centered.
Security, as a subject, need not be understood in national terms discussions of
‘human security,’ for example, often focuson the extent towhich individuals themselves
have access to certain rights or basic needs.The efforts to provide such notions of secu-
rity are often conceived in transnational terms. Similarly, some descriptions of the chal-
lenge posed by climate change sound in transnational or human security—recognition
that all are threatened and need protection.57
The question we should be asking when examining the varied security claims
described here is not the manner in which security is being sought nor the means
through which security is threatened, but what is being ‘secured.’ While some of the
claims currently being made can be connected to traditional military activities and
traditional concerns about, war, invasion, or subjugation, others like concerns over
data privacy, intellectual property theft, refugee flows, or environmental protection
are not, or if they are, only in very attenuated ways.58 Certainly, concerns about data,
53 See ‘President Donald J. Trump is Protecting the American Automobile Industry and its Vital Role in Our
National Security’, The White House, 17 May 2019. Notably, the above press announcement is listed under
the heading ‘Economy & Jobs.’
54 See Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT L/4250, 17 November 1975, at para 4; GATT
Council, ‘Minutes ofMeeting’, GATTC/M/109, 10November 1975, at 8–9; Sweden—Import Restrictions on
Certain Footwear, GATT L/4250/Add.1, 15 March 1977, at 1.
55 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks
Shape State Coercion’, 44 International Security 42–79 (Summer 2019).
56 On the Russia—Traffic in Transit decision, see Geraldo Vidigal, ‘WTOAdjudication and the Security Excep-
tion: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed—Something Blue?’, 46(3) Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 203 (2019); Voon, above n 26.
57 See, e.g., Maryam Jamshidi, ‘The Climate Crisis Is a Human Security, Not a National Security, Issue’, 93
Southern California Law Review Postscript 36 (2019).
58 There is a contingent of national security professionals who likely do see military threats in every corner of
transnational activity. And for some, anything that might provide a bargaining advantage might be classi-
fied as a matter of security. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University
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highlighted in the Grindr, TikTok, and Huawei cases, for example, have been framed
in traditional national security language, but the nature of the actual threat posed has
remained vague—some concerns regarding state or industrial espionage, some con-
cerns regarding personal privacy, gestures to the threat of influence campaigns and
election interference, or speculative concerns about the value of expanded data flows to
militarized artificial intelligence.59 To put it another way, the national security claims
underlying these concerns rely on preconceptions either that national security includes
notions of influence or propaganda, far removed from the physical threats tradition-
ally implicated, or that national security concerns have no temporal bounds, that any
advantage another state might accrue, for any eventual physical conflict, no matter
how speculative or distant, constitutes a national security threat. Under these precon-
ceptions, national security collapses upon itself, becoming synonymous with national
advantage or disadvantage.60 A belief in the intrinsic value of the particular ‘nation’ is
the core, fundamental engine of the claim.
This reveals the true logic of these national security claims: the common thread run-
ning through all of these claims is that a particular political unit, the nation or state, is
threatened, that its wealth or power is under attack, that its ability to determine the
rules that will govern and apply to its nationals warrant protection. National security
claims at their most fundamental level are claims about the value of nations and the
right to protect nations’ essential characters. This is true whether the claims are really
about military technology or about protecting jobs.61 Even in militarized contexts,
this idea is intrinsic in modern concepts of national security. Combined with notions
of self-determination, national security recognizes the right of individuals to choose
their national community.62 Borders, real and virtual, are justified (quite poorly in
many cases) as protection of those collective choices.
Thus while ‘security’ implies a risk worth defending against, ‘national’ suggests
where that defense should be centered. National security concerns are not ones best
Press, 1966). Their concerns are amplified considerably though by their alliance with those more concerned
about protecting national wealth and pride. The latter often use the language of the former to keep them on
board with their goals and to take advantage of international law’s exceptions for true national emergencies.
59 See, e.g., Drew Harwell and Tony Romm, ‘U.S. government investigating TikTok over national security
concerns’,Washington Post, 1 November 2019.
60 See, e.g., Peter Navarro, ‘Why Economic Security Is National Security’, RealClearPolitics, 9 December 2018
(‘[S]uch economic security readily translates into national security because it is only through an enduring
American prosperity where we will find the growth, resources, and technological innovations necessary to
field the most advanced military in the world.’).
61 See ‘Fact Sheets: President Donald J. Trump is Protecting the American Automobile Industry and its Vital
Role inOurNational Security’,White House, 17May 2019 (gesturing in both directions in one press release).
See also ‘Fact Sheets: President Donald J. Trump is Addressing Unfair Trade Practices That Threaten to
HarmOurNational Security’,White House, 8March 2018.That fact sheet notes simultaneously that: (i) ‘The
Department of Commerce’s report concluded that levels of foreign steel imports threaten to impair national
security by displacing domestic production’; (ii) ‘[T]hese industries will be able to reopen closed mills, sus-
tain a skilled workforce, and maintain or increase production’; and (iii) ‘One of the pillars of the President’s
National Security Strategy is to “Promote American Prosperity.”’ Ibid.
62 Notably, human rights treaties allow derogation from their rules ‘[i]n time of war or other public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation.’ European Convention on Human Rights Article 15.1; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 4. At least implicitly, the ‘life of the nation’ is held up as an
intrinsic value worth special, perhaps even preeminent protection.
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left to local policing nor to transnational action. To put it another way, when some-
thing is asserted as a national security ‘threat,’ it is a claim to national prerogative and
choice.63 To suggest that those threats aren’t urgent, based on some alternative base-
line of what should be in a nation’s interest, fails to take the claims for what they are
and attempts to replace themwith their opponents want them to be. Such threat claims
can be (perhaps, should be) contested.They cannot be subjected to objective, external
legal definition.
The national security exceptions are thus at their most fundamental levels expres-
sions of nationalism, a fence thrown up to preserve the integrity of national commu-
nities, national solidarity, and national decision-making against dissolution into the
global mush.64 It is thus no surprise that populist nationalists invoke the language of
national security to justify protectionist and anti-immigrant policies. But nationalism
here need not be understood in a pejorative sense.While this nationalismmight reflect
parochialism, it might also reflect democratic ideals and principles of subsidiarity or
a realistic assessment of the threat environment—a recognition that individuals need
the state’s protection against external threats/that only the state can protect them from
threats of domination. In this sense, national security claims not only embody argu-
ments favoring organization through national solidarity, they encompass and represent
all such arguments. If trade symbolizes all arguments for organization throughmarkets,
national security symbolizes all such claims for organization through nations.
States’ reactions to the global COVID-19 pandemic have exemplified this logic.The
threat of disease and death coupled with real and feared shortages of necessary equip-
ment and medicines have fairly been described as vital security concerns.65 But as in
other areas described here, security has most often been equated with national secu-
rity and national security with securing each state’s access to its own supplies. Focusing
attention on the safety of the ‘nation,’ national security rhetoric seems to have crowded
out calls for international responses and international cooperation in the allocation of
necessary supplies in favor of more parochial responses.66 Thus in Europe,67 India,68
63 This observation aligns with work of the Copenhagen School of international relations. See Chien-Huei
Wu, ‘The Securitisation of US-China Economic Relations: Contagion and Resilience’ (unpublished work-
ing paper) (describing work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and others). As Ole Wæver has explained, naming
something a national security threat is a ‘speech act.’ ‘By uttering “security,” a state-representative moves a
particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are nec-
essary to block it.’ OleWæver, ‘Securitization andDesecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed),On Security
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 46–86 at 55.
64 SeeWæver, aboven64 (‘Threats seen as relevant are, for themost part, those that effect the self-determination
and sovereignty of the unit.’).
65 See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, ‘COVID-19 Shows How the U.S. Got National Security Wrong’, Just Secu-
rity, 7 April 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69563/covid-19-shows-how-the-u-s-got-national-security-
wrong/.
66 See Geoffrey Gertz, ‘Coordinating the international distribution of medical goods’, in John R. Allen and
Darrel M. West (eds), Reopening the World: How to Save Lives and Livelihoods (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, 2020), 12–16; Mona Pinchis Paulsen, ‘COVID-19 Symposium: Thinking Creatively and
Learning from COVID-19—How the WTO can Maintain Open Trade on Critical Supplies’, Opinio Juris,
2 April 2020, http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/02/covid-19-symposium-thinking-creatively-and-learning-
from-covid-19-how-the-wto-can-maintain-open-trade-on-critical-supplies/.
67 See above Part II.
68 Ibid.
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andCanada,69 amongothers, national security investment screeninghasbeenextended
tomedical fields. Stories that theUSAhad sought to lureCureVac fromGermany to the
USA in hope of gaining access to a potential vaccine only seemed to confirm the need
for a defense against strategic acquisitions.70 Other states invoked national security to
throw up export controls and keep necessary supplies from leaving the country. Geof-
frey Gertz, using data from the International Trade Centre, counted ‘95 countries have
introduced some form of temporary export restrictions related to COVID-19’ by 10
May.71 At the same time, states have invoked national security powers, like theDefense
Production Act in the USA, to buy supplies wherever they can find them. Recently, it
was reported that theUSAhad bought ‘virtually all the stocks for the next threemonths
of one of the two drugs [Remdesivir] proven to work against Covid-19, leaving none
for the UK, Europe or most of the rest of the world.’72
But notably, though perhaps not surprisingly, the invocation of national security to
fight the pandemic has not been confined to medical supplies. As states have turned
their attention to supply chains for medical supplies, talk of ‘reshoring’ for national
security has quickly moved beyond the disease to other economic interests. Japan has
considered ‘encouraging manufacturers to source more from Southeast Asia and bring
production of highly profitable products, such as critical auto parts, back to Japan.’73
In the UK, an industry representative argues that the pandemic ‘has shown the impor-
tance of the manufacturing base not only to the economy but to national security as
well and that has been recognised by the Government.’74 ‘I would hope that there will
be [aboost] fromreshoring,’ he continued.75 In theUSA, theTrumpadministrationhas
couched its response as part of much larger trade fight with China, a message echoed
by an EU Commissioner.76 And of course, China has noticed. ‘The pandemic has
brought numerous challenges forChina: a protracted slowdown in the global economy,
prevailing anti-China sentiment in the West and the mixing of politics and business.
69 Amanda Connolly, ‘Risks from Chinese takeovers mean Canada needs tougher investment rules: experts’,
Global News, 8 June 2020 at 5:02 PM, https://globalnews.ca/news/7040029/canada-foreign-takeovers-
china/.
70 ‘Germany tries to stop US from luring away firm seeking coronavirus vaccine’, Reuters, 15 March 2020 at
7:31AMEDT, updated 15March 2020 at 9:38PMEDT, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/15/coronavirus-
germany-tries-to-stop-us-luring-away-firm-seeking-vaccine.html.
71 Gertz, above n 67, at 12.
72 Sarah Bosely, ‘US secures world stock of key Covid-19 drug remdesivir’, Guardian, 30 June 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/30/us-buys-up-world-stock-of-key-covid-19-drug.
73 ‘Japan Aims to Break Supply Chain Dependence on China in Light of Covid-19’, Japan Times, 6
March 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/06/business/japan-aims-break-supply-chain-
dependence-china/#.Xv5bt5NKhsY.
74 Tim Wallace, ‘Economy facing deep freeze without a vaccine’,Daily Telegraph, 13 May 2020.
75 “‘And if there’s any vindication of the President’s “Buy American, secure borders, and a strongmanufacturing
base” philosophy, strategy, and belief, it is this crisis – because it underscores everything that we see there.”’ 2
April 2020Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, andMembers of theCoronavirus Task Force
in Press Briefing (quote from Peter Navarro).
76 “‘The issue of dependency of the EU vis-à-vis China, and other countries…was on the table before Covid-
19,” said [EU Commissioner Stella] Kyriakides.’ Jim Brunsden and Michael Peel, ‘Covid-19 Exposes EU’s
Reliance on Drug Imports’, Financial Times, 20 April 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/c30eb13a-f49e-
4d42-b2a8-1c6f70bb4d55.
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“National security” is now often misused to block Chinese companies from markets
and technologies.’77
The quick elision of these policy concerns, of pandemic response and jobs, demon-
strates how the national security frame is fundamentally about the interests of the
nation rather than any particular threat. It equates security with nation and prioritizes
national needs, national prerogatives, and national decision-making. It is, in its most
irreducible, essential form, a claim for organizing through states.
VIII. OF PARADIGMSANDPLURALISM
What does this redefinition of the trade-security dilemma mean for current attempt
to find a path forward through or between the two? If trade and security reflect truly
different paradigms—market andnation—wecanno longer treat conflicts between the
two simply as technical matters of interpretation. Rather, when looking at the claims of
trade and security, we are looking at the claims of two competing systems mediating
conflicts through law is difficult, if not impossible.
Recognizing that trade and security, market and nation, reflect two different
paradigms clarifies but complicates the attempts to mediate the two. Seen through the
lens of international economic law, the test of any security measure is whether it can
meet the standards of the treaties in question and their exceptions clauses. The ques-
tion will be how much exceptional behavior by states the international economic law
tribunals should tolerate. But seen through the eyes of national security, the question
will be how long to tolerate trade rules that impinge upon core state concerns. Rather
than focusingon the languageof those treaties, focuswill fall on international law’s basic
protections of sovereignty, on domestic national security statutes that turn off trade
laws’ effects, on the deliberate hedging against full effect embodied in domestic treaty
implementation,78 and on the ultimate option of withdrawal. And these paradigms are
reinforced in siloed or semi-siloed communities of practice,79 whose member spend
almost all their time on one side of the glass door.80 A WTO DSB or investment arbi-
trationdecision that states appear to acceptwill be seenbypractitioners in those areas as
a win for the trade or investment regimes, but it will be amirage. So too, in the opposite
77 Edward Tse, ‘Staying for the Duration’, South China Morning Post, 29 April 2020.
78 See, e.g., Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts:
Lessons from the EU and Brazilian Experiences (New York: Springer Publishing, 2015) 48–50.
79 Cf. Brendan Sargeant, ‘Integrating Australia’s Security And Economic Policy Cultures’, East Asia
Forum, 5 December 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/05/integrating-australias-security-
and-economic-policy-cultures/(noting and bemoaning the separation of economic and security into dif-
ferent domains in Australia). On international law’s communities of practice, see Harlan Grant Cohen,
‘International Precedent and the Practice of International Law’, inMichael A. Helfand (ed),Negotiating State
and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2015) 172–194.
80 See Heiko Borchart, ‘Supply chain management and economic statecraft: a five-point agenda’, East
Asia Forum, 29 June 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/06/29/supply-chain-management-and-
economic-statecraft-a-five-point-agenda/(‘Whereas the security community considers FDI a potential vec-
tor for unwanted outside interference, the economic community sees it as a lubricant of economic
cooperation. Cooperation will not be possible without a proper understanding of the drivers shaping each
partners’ worldview.’).
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direction, with national security claims that are seemingly acquiesced to by the trade or
investment regime. Two separate systems of law, each and its proponents will claim the
right to determine the space allowed for the other. Peaceful accommodation between
the trade and security regimesdoesnot reflect systemic integration, butmerely peaceful
accommodation.81
Trade and security thus inhabit the realm of legal pluralism, and the laws in ques-
tion are best conceived as conflicts rules.82 This puts the various tribunals tasked with
judging the relationship in an uncomfortable position familiar to national courts deal-
ing with transnational litigation.They can strictly apply the rules or develop bright-line
tests and risk irrelevance, or they can experiment with judicial diplomacy, adopting
forms of comity that risk sullying their mystique as courts.
Noting the apparently irreconcilable claims of the trade and security paradigms,
some scholars have focused less on mediating conflicts than on forcing each paradigm
and its proponents to internalize the costs its actions impose on the other. SimonLester
and Huan Zhu have thus suggested reinterpreting national security actions within the
trade regime as a type of safeguard measure, a measure explicitly conceived as national
political safety valve for those invoking it.83 Aswith safeguards,84 they suggest, the best
responsemay not be to judge themeasure lawful or unlawful, but to instead allow other
states, harmed by the national security measure, to engage in rebalancing, withholding
commensurate benefits from the state that has invoked national security. Simon Lester
has since proposed with Inu Manak embedding such rebalancing within a carefully
designed WTO Committee on National Security that can structure and guide discus-
sions over both national security measures and proper compensation.85 Nicolas Lamp
has alternatively suggested responding to national security claims with non-violation
complaints within the WTO system.86 Such complaints would allow states harmed to
seek compensation without requiring any normative judgment of the national security
claims.87
81 This suggests toowhy power political explanations for current economic–national security collisions run out.
Power is shifting, but what makes current questions difficult are disagreements over what sorts of power and
wealth are worthwhile, and who across and within states should wield them. From a game theoretic stand-
point, the problem is not just resolving a game after power realities have shifted, but agreeing on what game
is actually being played.
82 See Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community’, 44 NYU
Journal of International Law and Politics 1049 (2012), at 1090–97.
83 Simon Lester and Huan Zhu, ‘A Proposal for “Rebalancing” To Deal With “National Security” Trade
Restrictions’, 42 Fordham International Law Journal 1451 (2019).
84 Under GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, WTO members can temporarily use trade restric-
tions to protect a domestic industry facing ‘serious injury’ as a result of a sudden and recent influx of
imports.
85 SimonLester and InuManak, ‘AProposal for aCommitteeonNational Security at theWTO’, 30Duke Journal
Comparative and International Law 267 (2020).
86 Nicolas Lamp, ‘At the Vanishing Point of Law: Rebalancing, Non-Violation Claims, and the Role of the Mul-
tilateral Trade Regime in the Trade Wars, Queen’s University Legal Research Paper’, forthcoming, available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470617.
87 The GATT allows members to bring a dispute where they believe that the actions of another member have
‘nullified or impaired’ a benefit they negotiated for, even when that othermember has not violated anyGATT
rules.
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From a pluralist perspective, one of the benefits of these suggestions is that they
shift focus from authoritative normative decisions and towards information sharing. By
focusing on the costs to others of national security claims, they can help those within
the national security paradigm to properly price their intervention and weigh their
impact not justwithin their framebutwithin that inhabitedbyothers aswell.While this
approach is exemplified in these non-adjudication models, it can be extended to adju-
dication ones as well. An alternative vision of the dispute settlement mechanisms—in
trade, investment, at the United Nations—is that they can be used to help establish
normative baselines. The point would not be to adjudicate the ultimate legality of par-
ticularmeasures, but instead to help share perspectives fromone regime or paradigm to
the other, clarifying the range of acceptable and unacceptable processes and measures,
with the hope of facilitating long-term accommodations. Actors within each paradigm
may still overstep what actors in the other will view as acceptable, but having identi-
fied the space of acceptable actions, may more often be able to remain within it. In this
regard, the key to the WTO panel’s decision in Russia—Traffic in Transit is not that
Russia won nor that the panel found aspects of Article XXI claims to be justiciable, but
instead its guidance as towhat it and future panelswould review such claims for.88 Like-
wise, the USA’s national security claims regarding its steel and aluminum tariffs may be
an opportunity for the panels considering them to send a signal about the frontier of
acceptable claims within the trade regime.89 The key observation though is that what-
ever mechanism is used to respond to disputes, accommodations between trade and
national security will in the end be political rather than legal.
IX. WHOSE JOBS,WHOSEDATA,WHOSEENVIRONMENT?
Thecontested political space between these paradigmswill become all themore impor-
tant as the market v nations dynamic extends into old and new fields. The exceptions’
clauses of the GATT and the UN Charter reflect accommodations between trade and
security, market and nation, of the late 1940s, based on geopolitical and economic real-
ities of the time,90 tweaked around the edges to reflect changing circumstances over the
decades that followed. The stability of that accommodation reflected stability in rela-
tive material conditions of the postwar world.91 But deepening disaffection over the
88 See Voon, above n 26.
89 Which those claims are certainly beyond.
90 For a nuanced account of the how the language of the GATT security exception emerged from a particular
moment, reflecting an imperfect accommodation between warring frames even within the US government
itself, seeMonaPinchis-Paulsen, ‘TradeMultilateralism andU.S.National Security:TheMaking of theGATT
Security Exceptions’, 41 Michigan Journal of International Law 109 (2020).
91 Notably, the most significant potential shift in material conditions of the postwar world—decolonization—
also produced the most significant threat to the postwar market-nation accommodation. The New Interna-
tional EconomicOrder (NIEO)proposed by newly independent states specifically sought to recenter control
of resources within the nation, asserting, for example, their ‘permanent control of natural resources.’ Propo-
nents objected to purported international law rules that left their economies in control of foreign capitalists.
The response, as Quinn Slobodian describes, was a redoubled effort to provide legal protections for capital
and markets at the international level, including by strengthening and expanding existing international eco-
nomic law institutions. See Slobodian, above n 45, at 218–62. In that battle between nations and markets,
markets emerged triumphant.
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allocation of wealth and resources punctuated by the global financial crisis, growing
recognition of the crisis posed by climate change, and anxiety about the revolutionary
changes of new technologies have challenged settlements over allocations of decision-
making authority. Many are unhappy with how wealth and power have been allocated
and anxious how these changeswill allocate and reallocate them in the future. And, this
frayed consensus is reified in tensions between frames and appeals to shift from one to
other. Battles over wealth distribution, over climate change policy, and over the regula-
tion of data are likely to sound in the language ofmarkets v nations, of freedom v threat,
of growth v security, of everyone v us.
Questions about global wealth distribution and the allocation of growth policies
to markets (trade) and redistribution policies to nations have been an early signal of
the instability inherent in existing regime choices—scouts in the coming battle for
decision-making territory.92 Populist politics both left and right have sought to dis-
lodge the assumption that the mix of jobs available is a question of markets rather than
national policy. Tariffs and industrial policy93 are bandied about as national policy tools
that can guarantee a particular mix of jobs at home,94 even at the expense of broader
wealth creation across nations.
Climate change has become a similarly contested problem, pulled between com-
peting frames. Is the problem, requiring complex balancing between policy priori-
ties, one best tackled through (i) national decision-making (and attendant national
sharing of burdens and benefits),95 a model exemplified by the Green New Deal,96
(ii) an international problem best approached through transnational cooperation,97 or
(iii) an interpersonal problem requiring individual solidarity across borders over
resource consumption and sustainability. In other words, is the paradigmatic response
92 SeeHarlanGrant Cohen, ‘What is International Trade Law For?’, 113 American Journal of International Law
326 (2019).
93 See, e.g., Michael Nienaber, ‘Germany, France agree industrial policy plan for Europe’, Reuters, 19 February
2019 at 8:06 AM, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-france-industrial-policy/germany-france-
agree-industrial-policy-plan-for-europe-idUSKCN1Q81IO; Todd Tucker, ‘Industrial Policy and Planning:
What It Is andHow toDo ItBetter’,Roosevelt Institute, 30 July 2019, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/industrial-
policy-and-planning/; Marco Rubio, ‘Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry’, Washing-
ton, DC: US Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 2019; Elizabeth Warren, ‘A Plan
ForEconomicPatriotism’,Medium, 4 June 2019, https://medium.com/@teamwarren/a-plan-for-economic-
patriotism-13b879f4cfc7.
94 Again, Trump administration statements are telling: “‘Your business was dead. And I put a little thing called
a “25% tariff” on all of the dumped steel all over the country. And now your business is thriving,” Trump said
at a rally in August in Monaca, Penn.’ Jeff Stein, ‘As a Kentucky mill shutters, steelworkers see the limits of
Trump’s intervention’,Washington Post, 25 October 2019.
95 Compare Mark P. Nevitt, ‘The Commander in Chief ’s Authority to Combat Climate Change’, 37 Cardozo
LawReview437, 443–44 (2015), withRichardH.Moss, ‘Environmental Security?The Illogic ofCentralized
State Responses to EnvironmentalThreats’, in Paul Painchaud (ed),Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental
Security (Quebec: Studies andResearchCenteronEnvironmentalPolicies (GERPE),UniversitéLaval, 1990)
at 24 (critiquing this view).
96 See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, ‘What is the Green New Deal?: A Climate Proposal Explained’,New York Times, 21
February 2019.
97 See Moss, above n 97; Jamshidi, above n 57.
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national subsidies for solar panel production98 and programs to create ‘good green jobs’
at home, an environmental goods agreement liberalizing trade in green technologies,99
or personal commitments to veganism, reduced air-travel, and a politics of sustain-
ability rather than growth. The conflicts have become particularly clear in divergent
responses100 to local subsidies attached to environmental policies and the WTO dis-
pute settlement system’s response.101 The conventional allocation of redistribution
policies to the national and growth policies to the transnational102 here cast a long
shadow. As the rhetoric of threat heats up, it will be important to recognize the inherent
disagreements over who should be making climate change policy, through what logic,
and according to what process.
The regulation of data too has put these questions in stark terms discussions of
transnational data flows toggle constantly between frames of personal privacy, com-
petitiveness, crime control, and national security, among others. With these frames
come competing policy prescriptions—national (or regional, as in GDPR) attempts
at privacy protection,103 demands for data localization,104 trade agreements promising
the free flow of data across supply chains,105 and pressures for decoupling the tech-
nologies of potentially adversarial states.106 Emerging battles over 5G, for example,
toggle between national security concerns over access to sensitive data, concerns about
national competitiveness in future technological fields, and concerns over corporate
abuses of personal privacy.The first suggest firewalls around national internets; the sec-
ond, supporting national champion companies in worldwide competition; the third,
98 See, e.g., Ryan Driskell Tate, ‘The federal government subsidized the carbon economy. Now it should sub-
sidize a greener one.’, Washington Post, 26 April 2019 at 6:00 AM EDT, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2019/04/26/federal-government-subsidized-carbon-economy-now-it-should-subsidize-greener-
one/; TimothyMeyer, ‘HowLocalDiscriminationCanPromoteGlobal PublicGoods’, 95 BostonUniversity
Law Review 1939 (2015).
99 See, e.g., James Bacchus and Inu Manak, ‘The Green New Deal Is Missing a Critical Element: Trade’,Hill, 28
March 2019, available at https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/green-new-deal-missing-critical-
element-trade.
100 Compare Todd Tucker, ‘Monkey Cage: There’s a big new headache for the Green New Deal’, Washing-
ton Post, 28 June 2019 at 5:00 AM EDT, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/28/theres-
big-new-headache-green-new-deal/with Simon Lester, ‘Misunderstandings on the WTO, Trade, and the
Environment’, CATOAt Liberty, 28 June 2019 at 9:16 AM, https://www.cato.org/blog/misunderstandings-
wto-trade-environment.
101 See, e.g., United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, DS510, 27 June 2019
(finding US state-level green energy programs requiring local equipment in violation of US obligations not
to discriminate against foreign producers).
102 See generally Cohen, above n 94; Gregory Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’, 2019
University of Illinois Law Review 1 (2019).
103 See, e.g., Shannon Togawa Mercer, ‘The Limitations of European Data Protection as a Model for Global
Privacy Regulation’, 114 AJIL Unbound 20 (2020).
104 See, e.g., JenniferDaskal, ‘LawEnforcementAccess toDataAcrossBorders:TheEvolving Security andRights
Issues’, 8 Journal of National Security Law and Policy 473 (2016); Chander and Lê, above n 2.
105 See, e.g., NehaMishra, ‘Building Bridges: International Trade Law, Internet Governance, and the Regulation
of Data Flows’, 52 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 463 (2019).
106 See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, ‘Trump’s Economic Iron Curtain Against China’, Foreign Policy, 23 August
2019 at 6:03 PM, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/23/trumps-economic-iron-curtain-against-china-
hawk-peter-navarro-american-factory-obama/.
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reining in oligopolistic internet companies. The Schrems II107 decision in Europe high-
lights these conflicts in different terms, pitting European control over privacy against
the US demands for security surveillance and private attempts to contract over data
flows.Theextreme instability of these frames is enough to inducewhiplash inobservers.
That instability though reflects the extreme ambivalence between markets and
nations underlying these frames. Data policies have the potential tomassively reallocate
wealth and authority in ways unfathomable to the designers of the current legal infras-
tructures. Tomany, data look different in kind fromother newly developed resources or
industries; other developments may have required tweaking the rules, but didn’t fun-
damentally threaten the basic calculus underlying them. The rules provided the right
amount of give to allow adaptation. The battles over data regulation suggest a shared
instinct that that is no longer the case, that it is not the rules that are being debated, but
the basic allocation of authority to make them. States, corporations, and individuals
shift alliances to gain advantage in a constant game of tug-of-war.
X. CONCLUSION
Geopolitical sands are shifting, leaving us feeling off-balance. Our carefully framed pic-
ture of the relationship between economics and national security seems out of focus.
And sharpening the picture seems only able to bring one or the other into clear view.
But our ambivalence reveals more than it obscures. The clarity of the prior picture was
a mirage, a temporary alignment between two views of how to organize the world. The
logic of markets and nations has diverged, promising different distributions of wealth,
power, and authority. In a world changed by multipolarity, technology, and climate,
battles between national security and economics are now battles for control.
107 Case C-311/18, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 16 July 2020.
